






1Control and Money Ta,-oe1:s:
"Everything"?
Fed Look At
Kenneth C. Froewiss and John P. Judd*
Target rates of growth for the monetary aggre-
gates have played anincreasinglyprominentrole
in discussions ofFederal Reserve policy overthe
last decade. The Federal Open Market Commit-
tee (FOMC) first incorporated the notion of
monetary targets into its policy directives in
1970. More recently, the establishment of such
targets has been mandated by Congress, first in
Joint Resolution 133 in 1975 and then in the Full
Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978
(the so-called "Humphrey-Hawkins Act").
While virtually all economists agree that the
behavior ofthe money supply has an important
effect on economic activity, many question the
wisdom of singling out this one variable from
amongall ofthose on which the Fed might focus
its attention. Indeed, to confer primacy on mon-
ey goes against a long Fed tradition of"looking
at everything" in attempting to gauge the direc-
tion of the economy and the correspondingly
appropriate monetary policy. Fed spokesmen
have, in fact, maintained that they do not inter-
pret the announced monetary targets in any
rigid, mechanistic way.l Rather, they view these
targets as broad guides to policy which may be
revised as necessary in the light ofnew economic
information.
The intuitive argument that the Fed should
"look at everything" in setting policy instead of
slavishly aiming at preannounced monetary tar-
gets has found support in the theory of"optimal
control".2 Described in more detail below, the
optimal-control literature essentially criticizes
the use of targets as being wasteful of informa-
tion, which, ifproperly employed, would permit
policymakers to be more successfulin thepursuit
oftheir economic goals. While we donotdispute
the theoretical basis of this optimal-control
position, we intend to assess its empiricalsignifi-
cance within the context in which it is likelyto be
used. Specifically, we ask this question: Dothose
financial-market variables which are frequently
cited as being importantforthe determination of
monetary policy convey reliable information
about aggregate spending in the economy be-
yond that contained in the movements'of the
money supply?
In Section I, we set out the basic principles of
optimal-control theory, and then review how
these ideas have been used to criticize a policy of
monetary targeting. Also, we examine the use of
information in the context of"real-world" poli-
cymaking. In Section 11, we translate these
theoretical considerations into econometrictests
of the information -about aggregate demand
contained in a large number offinancial-market
variables-bank credit and its components, in-
terest rates, and flow of funds-over andabove
monetary policy aggregates targeted by the Fed-
eral Reserve. From these tests, we concludethat
once policymakerslookata monetaryaggregate,
they can gain little additional information about
nominal GNP by also looking at otherfinancial-
market variables. These conclusions, as well as
some limitations of the study, are summarized in
Section III.
I. Optimal Control and Monetary Policy
Although the theory of optimal control has its
origin in the engineering literature, its funda-
mental ideas can be easily explained in terms of
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the problems confronted by economic policy-
makers. The most inexorable problem is uncer-
tainty. In theory, we can think oftheeconomy as
being accurately described by a large number of
so-called structural equations. This"truemodel"
ofthe economy includes equations specifying all
of the relationships which make up the structureofthe economy-suchas consumptionbehavior,
the demand for money, and so on. Even if
policymakers were confident that they knew the
"true" model of the economy, in the sense of
knowing which variables belong in each equa-
tion, the equations of that model would still
contain random components which cannot be
empirically estimated with complete precision.
In fact, policymakers' problems are com-
pounded by a lack ofcertainty about the under-
lying structure of the economy.
Another problem is the general inability of
available policy tools to affect directly the vari-
ables of ultimate concern, such as employment,
inflation, and real-output growth. In the lan-
guage of optimal control, the policy tools are
known as "instruments" and the variables such
as employment are known as "goal variables."
The policymaker, then, chooses settings for the
instruments believed consistent with the desired
values of the goal variables, while recognizing
that the link between the two is uncertain.
The situation is furthercomplicated by thefact
that the resulting actual values of the goal vari-
ables may not be immediately observable. There
may be lags in the transmission of policy. For
example, a change in the rate of growth of the
money supply may not be fully reflected by a
change in the rate ofinflation for a period ofup
to two years.3 Moreover, there may be further
lags in the gatheringofdata. Figuresfor GNPare
not available until after the end ofthe quarterto
which they refer, and the initial figures are
routinely revised, often by substantial amounts.
As a result ofthese lags, the economy could veer
off course for some time without policymakers
being aware of the situation. Indeed, this possi-
bility is not purely hypothetical. In 1974, a large
revision in the inventory-valuation adjustment
sharply changed perceptions regarding the over-
accumulation of inventories and, hence, the
likely severity of the ensuing recession. It is
conceivable that, had policymakers access to
better information in 1974,theirdecisions would
have been different.
Ofcourse, policymakers need not wait for the
release ofGNP data tolearnabouttheeconomy,
because monthly figures on personal income,
industrial production, retail sales, etc., provide
clues as to how the economy is evolving. Based
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on the observation of these "information vari-
ables," they can draw inferences abouttheunob-
served goal variables, and reset instruments if
that appears warranted. "Optimal control"
makes an important contribution by showing
policymakers how to makethe mosteffective use
ofthe feedback from informationvariableswhen
deciding whether to change the setting of the
instruments. The process is "optimal" in the
sense of minimizing some measure ofthe devia-
tion ofthe actual paths ofthegoalvariablesfrom
their desired paths.4
The formal mathematics of optimal control
theory is complex and will not be presented here.
But the underlying logic is simple: In order to
achieve optimal settings of the policy instru-
ments, it is necessary to utilize all available
information on the unobserved goal variables.5
Thus, the adherents of an optimal-control ap-
proach argue that a policy ofmonetarytargeting
inherently wastes information. We now turn to
an appraisal of that criticism.
Monetary Policy Targets
As mentioned at the outset, the Federal Re-
serve has repeatedly stressed in official state-
ments that it doesnotformulate short-runmone-
tary policy mechanistically, according simply to
the criterion of whether the money supply is
growing on target. Thus, although we present
here a highly stylized representation ofmonetary
targeting, we do not intend this to be used as a
description and assessment of how the Fed
currently conducts its affairs. Instead, we intend
it simply as an expositional device to help high-
light some ofthe key issues inthedebateoverthe
virtues of formal money targets.6
Consider the situation faced by monetary
policymakers at the time targets are initially
established. Theywish tosee thegoalvariablesof
unemployment, inflation, and real income
growth follow certain desired paths over the
planning period for which targets are to be set.
Forsimplicity, these three distinct goalvariables
can be grouped under the single rubric of"in-
come."7 On the basis of historical empirical
relationships, policymakers then choose growth
targets for the monetary aggregates which they
believe will be consistentwithachievementofthe
desired path for income.However, the money supply is not a variable
over which the Federal Reserve has direct con-
trol, i.e., it is not an "instrument." The Fed can
control directly the availability ofreserves to the
banking system or alternatively it can influence
even this variable indirectly by settinga valuefor
the Federal funds rate and providing whatever
quantity ofreserves is necessary to maintainthat
rate.8 Under present Federal Reserve regula-
tions, member banks must hold certain percen-
tages of their various deposit categories in the
form ofreserves. This meansthatdepositgrowth
is ultimately constrained by the rate at which
reserves are allowed by the Fed to expand. On
October 6th, the Fed announced a change in its
operating procedures which would involve di-
rectly setting the volume ofbankreserves (rather
than the previous method of using the Federal-
funds rate) to attempt to achieve its monetary-
aggregates targets. Thus the Fed is now using
reserves as its instrument, whereas up to October
6th the instrument was the Federal-fundsrate-
see the article by Judd and Scaddingin this issue.
But it would not be appropriateto call moneythe
instrument under either regime.
In the terminology ofoptimal control, money
is an information variable. Observations on the
money supply are available on a more timely
basis than are observations on income. More
importantly, changes in the rate of growth of
the money supply tend to lead changes in
overall economic activity. If the rate of money
growth is observed to be deviating from its
target, we may assume that income is (or will
be) deviating from its desired path, since the
money target was expressly chosen to be con-
sistent with the latter. In this situation, strict
adherence to a policy ofmonetary targets would
require that the supply of bank reserves be
altered to bring money growth back on target.
This simple description of the workings of a
money-targeting policy begs a host ofreal-world
issues. For example, what is the proper time
period over which to compare actual and target-
ed money growth? One week? One month? Fur-
thermore, what should the policy response be
when one measure of the money supply is ex-
ceeding its target while another is below target?
And shouldforecasts ofmoney growth be given
any weight, or only actual money growth?
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While all of these questions are important for
the implementation of a targeting procedure,
they can be safely ignored for purposes of this
study. Here, the concern is with two more
fundamental issues. First, can a policy which
relies solely on the information contained in
money to infer the behavior of income ever be
optimal? And second, would a policy which
consisted of mechanically moving reserves to
bring money back on target whenever it went
off track represent an optimal use of the infor-
mation in money itself? According to the adher-
ents of the optimal-control approach, the an-
swer to both of these questions is, "No."
The logic ofthe response is intuitively appeal-
ing in the case of the first question. Data on a
whole host of economic variables other than
money are available on a more timely basis than
are national-income statistics. For example, the
I'ederal Reserve publishes weekly numbers on
bank loans at the same time that it releases its
money-supply figures. A large bodyofeconomic
literature suggests that these numbers should
provide important clues to the strength ofecon-
omic activity.9 Similarly, interest rates on a wide
range ofsecurities can be monitored ona contin-
ual basis (as the Open-Market Desk of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York indeed
does). To the extent that interest rates are an
important link in the transmission ofmonetary
policy, they presumably provide another valu-
able source of information about income. A
priori, it is hard tounderstand why policymakers
should choose to ignore such information.
The reasoning behind the optimal-control
position on the second issue raised above-
whether automatically bringing money back on
track, onceit has strayed, represents the best use
of the information conveyed by the money
supply-is less obvious though easily explain-
able. We look to money for information on
income because ofthe assumption that there is a
stable relationship between the two through the
money-demand function. If money demand is
subject to random disturbances, however, devia-
tions of money from target may merely reflect
these random influences, and need not indicate
that income is off its desired path. If, for exam-
ple, the Federal Reserve were to offset a random
downward shift in money demand that wasunrelated to income, the result would be an
excess ofmoney supply over demand, which ifit
persisted would lead to inflation. If, on the other
hand, the drop in money were caused by a
random decrease in real economic activity, an
increase in the money supply by the Federal
Reserve to raise aggregate demand would be
appropriate. Furthermore, if other variables
than income enter the money-demand equation,
policymakers must consider the response of
money to these variables when formulating the
optimal policy reaction to a deviation ofmoney
from target. Since money demand apparently is
both subject to stochastic disturbances and re-
sponsive to changes in interest rates, it follows
that mechanically moving money back to target
will not, in theory, be the optimal policy. This is
true even if money is used as the sole source of
information about income. 1O
The empirical analysis in the remainder of
this article focuses only on the first ofthese two
separate issues-that monetary targets waste
information. Further, we restrict our attention
to financial-market variables as possible supple-
ments to the information on income contained
in money. We do not assume that "real" vari-
ables convey no information on income. Rath-
er, we limit his study to financial variables
because oftheir prominence in the literature on
the transmission of monetary policy to econom-
ic activity. An investigation of potential real-
sector information variables could be the sub-
ject of another long paper. Furthermore, our
choice of variables is meant to reflect the natu-
ral inclination of monetary policymakers to
look to the financial markets for a reading on
the economy.
Finally, restricting the analysis to financial
variables does not undermine the practical rele-
vance of this study. In early 1979, for example,
money growth as measured by both M1 and M2
was sluggish, while bank lending was growing
rapidly. Policymakers were forced to decide
whether the money-supply figures accurately
reflected the imminence of a period of slack in
real economic activity, despite the surge in bank
loans. JJ In fact, the empirical estimation in the
next section is based on the kind of analysis
which policymakers at least implicitly perform
when confronted with such divergent trends.
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Information Variables: Policy Context
We noted previously that one ofthe problems
faced by policymakers is their lack ofknowledge
ofthe "truemodel" of the economy.Ifthey knew
the equationsofthatmodel(oreven thevariables
involved), they would presumably be able to
extract information about income out of cur-
rently available data. Buttheiruncertaintyabout
the true model leaves them little choice but to
rely on a few variables which in their experience
have been correlated with GNP in the past, and
which are available on a timely basis. Because of
differences in jndividual judgment and experi-
ence, differences also occur in policymakers'
choices of variables to watch. Not surprisingly,
then, policy briefings tend to involve the presen-
tation of the latest figures from a wide range of
economic time series, from which each policy-
maker can choose the two or three variables
which he or she believes convey the most infor-
mation about economic activity.
In effect, each policymaker replaces the (un-
known) full structural model with a single-
equation model, in which income isexplained by
several variables on which he has focused his
attention. These variables generally include
monetary-policy and fiscal-policy measures, but
are not limited to them. Since many financial-
market measures are "endogenous" (i.e., deter-
mined in the full model), the single equation is
properly called a"semi-reduced form," todistin-
guish it from a "reduced form" in which only
"exogenous" or policy variables are used to
"explain" movements in income. Also, these
equations do not necessarily represent the opti-
mal way for policymakers to use indirect infor-
mation about aggregate demand. Instead, they
are designed to represent a reasonable approxi-
mation to the way policymakers use such infor-
mation in practice.
In this sense, and only in this sense, we use
such equations toestablish a strongpresumption
for the existence of (or lack of) "information"
about aggregate demand in the variables tested.
Given the use of this concept of"information,"
the problem reduces to searchingfor correlations
between potential information variables and
nominal GNP. Where such correlations are
found to be statistically significant, we conclude
that available information is sufficiently reliableto be potentially usable by policymakers.
Any search for information variables would
logically begin with measures of monetary and
fiscal policy. Examples would include the policy
variables for which the Federal Reserve current-
ly reports targets to Congress (M], M2 , M3 , and
bank credit). The Fed presumably believes that
these aggregates contain significant information
about GNP, and besides, it is required under the
Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978 to specify
growth ranges for them in conducting monetary
policy. Our basic equations express growth in
nominal GNP as functions of growth in several
monetary-policy variables (M], M2 , and bank
credit)-and in addition,as afunction ofafiscal-
policy variable (high-employment federal ex-
penditures),12 These basic equations are the
familiar St. Louis equations, which have been
widely discussed in the economics literature,'3
generally as measures ofthe relative importance
of monetary and fiscal policy. However, we
employ these equations in a completely different
way. We add various information variables to
these equations and ask the qu~stion: Do these
financial-market variables contain anyaddition-
al information about aggregate demand not
already contained in variables measuring mone-
tary and fiscal policy?
The financial-market variables examined in-
clude (1) bank credit and its major components,
(2) interest rates of various maturities, and (3)
aggregate activity in the credit markets. In select-
ing variables for testing, we tried to be theoreti-
cally agnostic: to "run the gamut" of financial
variableswhicharecommonly1.lsed in economic-
policy briefings, and which might logically flow
from either Keynesian or Monetarist theories.
Contemporaneous values of these variables
were entered in the equations, even though
policymakers lack access to some current infor-
mation because of lags in the data. Thus our
equations test for information in the variables
themselves, and do not determine whether poli-
cymakers actually have access to such informa-
tion. This is no problem for interest rates, where
there are no effective data lags. Also it is only a
minor problem for monetary and banking data,
where the lags are only a week--but where
revisions are occasionally substantial. In the
case of flow-of-funds data, however, the lags
exceed one quarter, so that any potential infor-
mation involves the use of either forecasts or
lagged data. Since our basic tests may overstate
the amount of accessible information in the
flow-of-funds variables, we include additional
(forecasting) regressions to determine whether
our basic results with these particular variables
would be affected.
II. Testing for Financial Market Infonnation
Theprecedingdiscussionconceptuallydefined The policy variables include those that would
the empirical tests conductedfor the information normally be found in standard St. Louis
content of financial-market variables. We next equationsI4-high-employment government ex-
describe the particularform ofthese tests, which pendituresas thefiscal-policy variable, 15 andM1,
are based on econometric estimates of semi- M2, and bank credit alternatively as the
reduced form equations. As mentioned earlier, monetary-policy variable. Bank credit, although
the equations are designed to determine whether having less operational significance for mone-
or not the financial-market information vari- tary policy at present than the monetary aggre-
abIes add significantly to the precision with gates, has received strongsupportas an alternate
which monetary-and fiscal-policy variables policy measure, especially during the extended
by themselves explainaggregatedemand. Specif- debate on this subject in the early 1970'S.16 In
ically, we use F-tests to determine if standard agnostic fashion, we have simply performed our
errors from aggregate-demand equationsinclud- tests with all three monetary-policy aggregates.
ing only the policy variables are significantly 4 4 4
higher than standard errors from equations Yt=a + k biMt-i +k CiFr-i + k dJt-i (1)
which also include financial-market variables. i=O i=O i=O
The estimating equations are described in (1) where all variables are entered approximately as
below. percentage changesl7 and are defined as follows.
42See Appendix 1 for data sources and glossary.
Y = nominal gross national product.
M = monetary-policy aggregates.
MI =currency plus commercial-bank
demand deposits adjusted
M2=M1+ commercial-bank saving and
time deposits except large negotiable
certificates of deposit
total bank credit (BC)
F = fiscal-policy variable =high-employment
Federal expenditures.
I = financial-market "information"variables.
commercial-bank variables
total bank credit (BC)
loans to nonfinancial business (BL)
ratio oftotal loans to total bank credit
(P)
interest rates
Federal funds rate (RFF)
4-6 month prime commercial-paper
rate (RCP)





total outstanding credit extended to
the household sector (TCE/HH)
total outstanding credit extended to
the nonfinancial business sector
(TCE/NFB)







over times t through t-4 where coef-
fients at times t+1 and t-5 are tied to
zero.
Serial correlation:
first degree Cochrane-Orcutt adjust-




information variables replaced by fit-
ted values from instrumental-variables
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regressions (see Appendix 2 for a de-
scription of the instruments used).
In choosing particularseries withineachofthe
financial-market categories, we tried to include
variables which are systematically involved in
the process by which Federal Reserve open-
market operations influence the economy. Our
purpose was not to advance particUlar hypo-
theses, but rather to test as many credible vari-
ables as possible. It should be noted that bank
credit enters the equations in two roles. This
variable appears as a monetary-policyaggregate
in conjunction with financial-market informa-
tion variables, and, alternatively, as a financial-
market information variable inconjunctionwith
M I and M2.
The end-point for the sample period was
chosen as 1977.4 because later data were influ-
enced by changes in the monetary aggregates,
brought about by recent changes in banking
regulations.IS Indeed, an even earlier end-point
could have been chosen, because some evidence
showed that the demand for money (especially
Md actually began shifting in 1974.3. 19 But
preliminary estimates indicated that the inclu-
sion of 1975-77 in the sample period uniformly
raised the standard errors of the equations esti-
mated (with and without information variables)
and thus did not change any ofourconclusions.
Meanwhile, the beginning point of the sample
period was chosen as 1961.1, because that
marked the beginning ofsome well-documented
changes in bank behavior (i.e., thedevelopment
of liability management).20
As mentioned earlier, the equations are semi-
reduced forms, in that they include exogenous
policy variables which belong in the reduced
form of nominal GNP21 and, in addition,en-
dogenous financial variables. In order to avoid
the statistical problems associated with estimat-
ingequationswith endogenousexplanatoryvari-
ables, we used an instrumental variables ap-
proach with respect to the contemporaneous
values ofthe financial-market informationvari-
ables. Actually, the results from ordinary least-
squares (OLS) regressions are presented in the
text, since these results arevery similiarto those
obtained with instrumental variables, and thus
do not affect the article's conclusions. Theinstrumental-variables results are shown in Ap-
pendix 3, and the instruments are described in
Appendix 2.
Empirical Results
The top row of numbers in Table 1 represent
the standarderrors from three"St. Louis" equa-
tions with nominal GNP regressed on high-
employment government expenditures and a
monetary-policy variable (alternatively,M I , M2 ,
and bank credit), and nofinancial-market infor-
mation variables. The standard errors from
regressions which include information variables
were compared with those from the St. Louis
equations, by means of5-percent and I-percent
F-tests, to see if the information variables could
reduce the standard errors in the respective St.
Louis equations by a statistically significant
amount.
Table 1
Standard Errors of Regressions
1961.1-1977.4
(Ordinary Least Squares Regressions)
Policy Variables
Information
Variables M1,F M2,F BC,F
None 2.95 2.89 3.16
MI N/A 2.92 2.99*
M2 2.92 N/A 2.91**
BC 2.99 2.90 N/A
BL 3.00 2.90 3.16
P 2.95 2.93 3.09
,P,RCP 2.94 2.89 3.03
RCP 2.89 2.82 2.97*
RtF 2.88 2.80 2.97*
RCB 2.94 2.96 3.20
RCIl,RCP 2.91 2.84 3.00
TCE 2.93 2.88 2.98*
TCE/flH 2.50** 2.53** 2.58**
TCE/NFB 2.86 2.87 3.09
LA/NFB 2.81* 2.84 2.90**
*Indicates standard errors which are significantly lower (at
5 percent)than those ofcorrespondingregressions with no
information variables.
** Indicates standarderrors which are significantly lower (at
I percent) than those ofcorrespondingregressionswith no
information variables.
N/A ::: not applicable
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None of the three bank-credit information
variables-aggregate bank credit, bank loans to
nonfinancial borrowers, and the ratio of total
bank loans to bank credit-passed either test.
None of the three contained information in
addition to MI , and M2 , while the latter two
credit variables did not significantly reduce the
standard errors from the St. Louisequationwith
bank credit as the monetary policy variable. 22
Similarly, the various long- and short-term
interest rates tested were not found to contain
additional information in the MI , and Ml equa-
tions. But in the bank-credit equation, both the
funds rate andthecommercial-paperratesignifi-
cantly reduced the standard errors. Thustests of
eight bank-creditand interest-ratevariables(and
combinations thereof) against three measures of
monetary policy (23 regressions in all) produced
only two cases in which additional information
was found. Both of these cases involved short-
term interest rates as information variables,and
bank credit as the measure ofmonetary policy.
In contrast, the tests of the flow-of-funds
variables (last four rows ofTable 1) produced a
number of cases in which information existed
overand above thatin the policyvariables. Total
outstanding credit extended to households was
significant for M j , M2 , and Be. Liquid assets of
nonfinancial business significantly reduced the
standard errors in the MI and Be equations,
Table 2





Variables M1,F M2,F BC,F
None 2.95 2.89 3.16
TCE 2.95 2.89 3.02"
TCE/HH 2.68** 2.65** 2.97"*
TCE/NFB 2.93 2.89 3.18
LA/NFB 3.01 3.04 3.11
* Indicates standard errors which are significantly lower (at
5 percent) than those ofcorrespondingregressions with no
information variables.
** Indicates standard errors which are significantly lower (at
I percent) than those ofcorrespondingregressions with no
information variables.while outstanding credit extended to all nonfi-
nancial sectors passed the F-test in the BC
equation.23 Thus additional information was
detected in six out of the twelve equations esti-
mated with flow-of-funds variables.
Because of the time lag in the availability of
flow-of-funds data, the results probably over-
state the usable information in those variables.
To try to extract the necessary information,
policymakerswould presumablyattempttofore-
cast contemporaneous values of flow-of-funds
variables. Theinstrumentalvariables regressions
provide a convenient approximation to this
forecasting situation. In these regressions, the
contemporaneous values of financial-market
information variables are replaced by in-sample
estimates from first-stage equations. Since in-
sample estimates are generally more accurate
than out-of-sample forecasts, the instrumental-
variables regressions perhaps overstate the
amount of usable information in flow-of-funds
Table 3
long-Run Elasticities of Ywith Respectto M
1961.1-1977.4
(Ordinary least Squares Regressions)
Policy Variables
Information
Variables M1,F M2,F BC,F
None .74** .84** .32*
MI NjA .73* -.03
M2 .08 NjA -.13
BC .79** .91** NjA
BL .80** .90** 1.91
P .68** .74** .35*
P,RCP .70** .72** .43*
RCP .75** .74** .47**
RFF .74** .74** .45**
RCB .73** .88** .24
RCB,RCP .73** .90** .58**
TCE .36 .56 .08
TCEIHH .51* ,48* 21
TCEjNFB 1.10** .88** .69**
LA/NFB .39 .58* .11
* Indicates long-run elasticities which are significantly dif-
ferent from zero at the 5-percent level.
** Indicates long-run elasticities which are significantly dif-
ferent from zero at the I-percent level.
NjA not applicable
45
variables. Nevertheless, they should do a better
job than the ordinary least-squares regressions
summarized in Table 1.
These more realistic results (see Table 2) fail
to detect additional information in liquid assets
of nonfinancial business in the M1 and BC
regressions, as did the OLS tests. The signifi-
cance of outstanding credit extended to house-
holds (with M1, M2 , and BC), and the same
measure for all nonfinancial sectors (with BC)
hold up in the instrumental-variables runs. As
for the M1and M2 equations, it is difficult to say
why credit extended to the household sector
would contain additional information, while the
same measure for all nonfinancial sectors and
the nonfinancial business sector do not.
The results in Table 1can also be used toassess
the Federal Reserve's practice oftargeting more
than one monetary-policy aggregate. Is the ex-
planatory power ofa single aggregate improved
when a second aggregate is also considered? Our
results indicatethatBCcan be improveduponby
also looking at M] or M2, but that the reverse is
not true.
M j and M2 thus outperform BC as a measure
of monetary policy, as can be seen from the fact
that the St. Louis equations yield somewhat
lower standard errors with M1and M 2(2.95 and
2.89 respectively) than with BC (3.16). In addi-
tion, only one of the thirteen information vari-
ables tested improved upon the M1 and M2
equation, while there were seven such variables
for Be.
Further evidence is presented in Table 3,
which shows the long-run elasticities ofnominal
GNP with respect to the monetary-policy vari-
able indicated at the top of each column, when
the information variable(s) indicated for each
row is (are) also in the regression. M2 maintains
its highly significant coefficientwhen M1and BC
are separately added to the equation. M1retains
its significant coefficient when BC is included in
the equation, but becomes insignificant in the
presence ofM2• Finally, the significance ofBCis
eliminated by both monetary aggregates. When
the entire list of information variables is consid-
ered, the long-run coefficients onM1and M2are
significant in all but a few cases, whilethisis true
for BC in only six of thirteen cases.The empirical results can be summarized as
follows:
I. After testing a large number of potential
informationvariables measuring variousaspects
of bank credit, interest rates and flow offunds,
we found only onevariable(totalcreditextended
to households) which contained information
about aggregate demand in addition to M1 and
M2 (1Vhen separately paired with a fiscal-policy
variable).
2. When bank credit was used as the measure
of monetary policy, we found that two interest
rates (on commercial paper and federal funds)
and two flow-of-funds variables (total credit
extended to nonfinancial sectors and to the
household sector) containedadditionalinforma-
tion.
3. M2 uniformly outperformed M1 which, in
turn, outperformed bank credit as a measure of
monetary policy. We found that Be contained
no information over and above that in either M1
or M2 , while both of the latter variables con-
tained information in addition to Be.
This study thus has accumulated a great deal
of negative evidence on the information content
ofcredit-market variables. But in doingso, ithas
produced one very strong positive result: once
money (especially M2 ) is included in an
aggregate-demand equation, there is little to be
gained by also looking at credit-market vari-
ables, or for that matter, at other monetary-
policy variables.
III. Conclusions
Optimal-control theory implies thatmonetary
policy is unlikely to be optimal if available
information about goal variables is not used.
While this conclusion is theoretically unassail-
able, it cannot be considered relevant in practice
without determining which variables, if any,
contain information in addition to the policy
variables on which policymakers naturally rely.
This article addresses that important policy
question for a representative set of financial-
marketvariables. The statistical testsindicate,in
particular, that once policymakers take account
of growth in money (especially M2), they can
gain little additional information about aggre-
gate demand from such variables as bankcredit
(and its components), interest rates,andflow-of-
funds variables.
The study has several limitations. First, we
have not tested potential information variables
from the real sector of the economy. Second,
our study uses quarterly data, whereas mone-
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tary policy is conducted on a month-by-month
basis, so that we may be missing some informa-
tion from credit-market variables about very
short-run changes in aggregate demand. Third,
we have not investigated the possibility that
only the unexpected portion of movements in
financial-market variables contain information
about GNP. Finally, as noted earlier, we have
not addressed the question of how the Federal
Reserve should respond to deviations in money
from target-which is an important question if
money is used as the sole source ofinformation
about aggregate demand. Despite these caveats,
we believe that the present research has put the
burden of proof on those who argue that the
Federal Reserve should not target money be-
cause this involves "throwing away" significant
financial-market information. Furthermore,
these results re-confirm the robustness of the









Variable Names and Sources of Data
Total loansand investments .of all commercial banks (FR Board)
= Loans to nonfinancial business of all commercial banks (Flow of Funds Accounts)
Constant term
Bigh-emt>loyment federal expenditures (FRB S1. Louis)
= Liquid as&ets of the nonfinancial business sector (Flow of Funds Accounts)
= Currency plus demand deposits adjusted (FR Board)
= M1+ time and savings deposits at commercial banks other than large negotiable
certificates of deposit (FR Board)
P = Total bank loans of all commercial banks/BC (FR Board)
R C B Moody's Aaa bond rate (Moody's Investors Service)
R CP 4-6 month prime commercial paper rate (FRBoard)
R F F Federal funds rate (FR Board)
T CE = Total credit extended to nonfinancial sectors (Flow of Funds Accounts)
TCE/HH = Total credit extended to the household sector (Flow of Funds Accounts)
TCE/NFB= Total credit extended to the nonfinancial business sector (Flow of Funds Accounts)
Y = Nominal gross national product
APPENDIX 2
Instrumental Variables Specifications
The following equations were used togenerate the instrumentalvariables used in the instrumental
variables regressions. See Appendix 3 for those regression results.
2 2 2 2
It = a +I biIt-i +I c[M t-i +I d[RFFNt_i+I e[Ft-i+ f'POpt-1
i=1 i=l i=l i=1





financial market information variables as defined in the text.
currency plus demand deposits adjusted.
federal-funds rate, unless I = federal-funds rate, in which case RFFN = 90-day prime
commercial-paper rate.
= high-employment federal expenditures.
= total U.S. population.
47APPENDIX 3
Results from Instrumental Variables Regressions
Table 1A Table 2A
Standard Errors of Regressions Long-Run Elasticities of Ywith RespecttoM
1961.1-1977.4 1961.1-1977.4
(Instrumental Variables Re.gressions) (Instrumental Variables Regressions)
Policy Variables Policy Variables
Information Information
Variables M1,F M2,F BC,F Variables M1,F M2,F BC,F
None 2.95 2.89 3.16 None .74** .84** .32*
M I N/A 2.92 2.99* MI N/A .73* -.08
M2 2.92 N/A 2.91** M2 .08 N/A -.11
BC 3.00 2.91 N/A BC .83** .89** N/A
BL 3.21 3.15 3.17 BL 1.00** 1.17** 1.90
P 2.95 2.94 3.09 P .65** .72** .36
P,RCP 2.95 2.92 3.06 P,RCP .73** .79** .48*
RCP 2.90 2.83 2.99* RCP .78** .76** .51**
RFF 2.88 2.80 2.98* RFF .76** .76** .49**
RCB 2.95 2.97 3.21 RCB .73** .88** .25
RCB,RCP 2.91 2.85 3.01 RCB,RCP .75** .90** .60**
TCE 2.95 2.89 3.02* TCE .30 .51 .08
TCE/HH 2.68** 2.65** 2.75** TCE/HH .48 .37 .21
TCE/NFB 2.93 2.89 3.18 TCE/NFB 1.29** .93** .49
LA/NFB 3.01 3.04 3.11 LA/NFB .26 .42 .02
* Indicates standard errors which are significantly lower(at
5-percent level) than those of corresponding regressions
with no information variables.
**Indicates standard errors which are significantly lower(at
I-percent) than those ofcorresponding regressions with no
information variables.
N/A = not applicable
* Indicates long-run elasticities which are significantly dif-
ferent from zero at the 5-percent level
**Indicates long-run elasticities which are significantly dif-
ferent from zero at the I-percent level.
N/A = not applicable
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2. See in particular Benjamin M. Friedman, "The Ineffi-
ciency of Short-Run Monetary Targets for Monetary
Policy", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
(1977:2), pp. 293-335.
3. Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A
Monetary Historyofthe UnitedStates, 1867-1960(prin-
ceton, 1963).
4. In particular, the variance of the difference between
the actual and desired values of the goal variable(s)
over time is generally used.
5. While this condItIon is necessary for optImal control,
it is clearly nolsufficient. As discussed in the nextsub-
section, optimal-control adherents also criticize
monetary-polley targets for causing inappropriate re-
sponses to the information contained in money about
GNP.
48
6. On the question of the usefulness of this simplified
description, see B. Friedman (1977), pp. 294-295.
7. The assumption that there is only one goal variable
avoids the problem of whether in fact there are suffi-
cient instruments available to achieve several inde-
pendent goals.
8. The Fed can, of course, affect the volume of reserves
through changes in the discount rate, and can alter the
effective level of reserves through changes in reserve
requirements. These complications are not important
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deceleration.
12. A longdebateexistsintheeConomics literatureover
the statistically and conCeptually superior measure of
fiscal policy. Ifany consensus hasdevEllpped, itfavors
the high-employment federal expenditures measure.
See "Technical Notes for Estimates of the High-
Employment Budget" Federal Reserve Bank of. St.
Louis, unpublished paper, March 1968, for a descrip-
tion of this variable. Also see footnote 13 for papers
using this variable.
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Frederick Schadrack, and Fred Levin under the head-
ing, "TheChoice of Intermediate Targets," in Monetary
Aggregates and Monetary Policy, the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, 1974. A summary discussion of
those results may be found in Benjamin Friedman,
"EmpiriCal Issues in Monetary Policy," Journal of
Monetary Economics (1977:3), pp. 87-101.
17. Specifically, theequationsare estimated in changes
in logarithms, which is similar to using data expressed
as percentagechanges. Percentagechanges have been
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changes in standard St. Louisequationsestimatedover
1953-1976.5.ee Carlson (1978).
18. See Thomas D. Simpson, "AProposal for Redefin-
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tin (January 1979), pp.13-42.
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Demand Equations," Journal of Political Economy
(1978:2), pp. 211-228.
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composition of bank credit in an equation similartoour
"P,RCP" equation shown in Table 1. However, he used
the 1953-72 sample period, and the raw government
surplus fora fiscal variable. The reverse-causation bias
in this variable in aggregate-demand equationswas the
major reason. for the development of the high-
employment government expenditures variable in
Anderson-Jordan (1968).
23. The insignificance of this variable in the M1 and M2
equations is consistent with the results in Richard G.
Davis, "Broad Credit Measures as Targetsfor Monetary
Policy," Quarterly Review (Federal Reserve Bank of
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